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OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POSITION OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE BOARD*
ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER**
During the Spring of 1964 the Subcommittee on Domestic
Finance of the Banking and Currency Committee of the
House of Representatives held a series of important hearings
on the position of the Federal Reserve System in Ameri-
can Government and in the American economy The Sub-
committtee, under the chairmanship of Representative Wright
Patman of Texas, had five bills before it for consideration:
H.R. 3783; H.R. 9631, H.R. 9685; H.R. 9686; H.R. 9687
In main thrust, these bills would, if enacted, substantially
change the position of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System by placing it under direct control of the
President and would otherwise alter the System as it has
existed since its establishment in 1913.
This brief paper discusses certain legal-policy questions
involved in those bills. At the outset I should like to under-
score two factors: first, that this is a public law analysis-
a legal analysis, in other words-and the economic effects
of the monetary structure are not a part of this discussion,
although it is clear that a legal analysis cannot escape being
concerned with certain policy questions; second, that in such
a brief statement all details cannot be covered. Necessarily,
then, I shall confine myself to several broad propositions.
Some of what I will say may be obvious to some, but none-
theless I think it bears restatement.
1. Although Congress has undoubted constitutional power
over monetary matters, that power is in fact fragmented
over several agencies of government.
*The substance of this article consists of testimony presented on April 14,
1964 before the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency of the House of Representatives. The article has been left in
the same form as it was presented the only additions are the introductory and
concluding paragraphs.
**Professor of Law, The George Washington University. A.B., 1938, Willa-
mette University; LL.B., 1949, Stanford University School of Law.
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Under article I, section 8 of the Constitution, Congress
could, of course, establish a system whereby it would itself
regulate the value of money and such allied matters as
were considered necessary and proper to carry out that
goal. Or Congress, alternatively, could do nothing; there
is nothing in the Constitution which affirmatively requires
Government to take such action; it could be left entirely
to private volition. I take it that neither of those alternatives
is considered desirable.
What has been done seems to be a series of delegations
of power from Congress-to the Treasury and to the Federal
Reserve Board, and also to the Comptroller of Currency
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation-whereby
either executive departments or agencies or "independent"
organizations exercise some influence and power over mone-
tary matters. It thus seems valid to conclude that the
Congress, for whatever reasons, believes that such power
should be fragmented and exercised by a congeries of
organizations, not excluding the Congress itself.
This is in accord with our history, but the question now
is whether such splintering of power is desirable. My con-
clusion, which I will expand a little later, is that whatever
merit power fragmentation may have as between branches
of government, it has little or none so far as one branch
is concerned.
2. Congressional delegations of power in monetary mat-
ters are valid under the Constitution.
The law on delegation of power is a latterday gloss on
the Constitution enunciated, as far as limitations are con-
cerned, by the Supreme Court during the thirties. There
have been only two cases in history which have invalidated
attempted delegations to governmental agencies, both of
which grew out of early legislation m the administration
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Schechter' a n d
Panama Oil2 cases, both of which did not involve delegation
to a regularly constituted administrative agency which fol-
lowed an established procedure designed to afford customary
1. Schechter Corp v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
2. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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safeguards to affected parties. There was a third case, the
Carter Coal' decision, which did involve the agricultural
legislation at that time and which to some extent concerned
a delegation of what was considered to be a private organi-
zation. The Supreme Court in the Carter Coal case held this
agricultural legislation invalid.
The black-letter rule of law, in brief, seems to be this:
power committed by the Constitution to the Congress may
be delegated, provided that the delegation is not of unlimited
discretionary power As the Supreme Court said in 1928:4
If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an in-
telligible principle to which the person or body author-
ized [to act] is directed to conform, such legis-
lative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative
power
Using that principle, the Supreme Court struck down the
two statutes in the cases mentioned above. Neither statute
contained an "intelligible principle" to canalize the admin-
istrative action.
But that is not the end of the matter As subsequent
court decisions have shown, and as practice has developed,
Congress has delegated power to the executive branch and
to the so-called independent regulatory commissions under
the most liberal standards, with the net result that it is fair
to say that the present-day viability of the Schechter and
Panama Oil cases is extremely dubious. Thus to cite but
two examples, Congress enacted legislation for the renego-
tiation of contracts during World War II and the recovery
of "excessive profits," but failed to define "excessive";
nevertheless, the delegation was upheld by the Supreme
Court5 ; and in the Communications Act of 19346, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission was invested with power
to operate as the "public convenience, interest, or necessity
requires." This, too, was upheld by the Supreme Court.
7
3. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
4. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
5. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
6. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
7. For a complete discussion of the cases on delegation, see I DAVIS, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE ch. 2 (1958) see also Miller, The Public Interest
Undefined, 10 J. Pub. L. 184 (1961).
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There have been other delegations of a similar nature
under generous standards. This has led Professor Ken-
neth Culp Davis to make the statement: "Congress sees the
problem, throws the ball to the administrative agencies,
says in effect, 'Here is the problem, deal with it as you
see fit' "8
The point is not that such delegations are either im-
proper or even avoidable. I take it that they are-or seem
to be-inescapable in our modern, industrialized economy
Rather, the point is that Congress can, and apparently has,
turned over complete control of monetary matters to non-
legislative organs. Congress, accordingly, appears to have
lost whatever-control it may once have had, and theoretically
still retains. Thus, under the statute providing for the crea-
tion of a Federal Open Market Committee, the "intelligible
principle" supposedly required for delegation to adminis-
trative agencies seems to have almost vanished. The statute
reads: 9
(c) The time, character, and volume of all purchases
and sales of paper described in sections 353-359 of
this title as eligible for open-market operations shall
be governed with a view to accommodating com-
merce and business and with regard to their bearing
upon the general credit situation of the country
No doubt a higher degree of specificity delineating the
powers of the delegate of congressional power would be
difficult to come by in this instance, and still permit flexi-
bility of operation. But this delegation does cede complete
power to the Open Market Committee. Even so, my pre-
diction would be that it would be upheld if ever challenged
in court; and, parenthetically, I am not sure that it could
be challenged in court, as it would be difficult to find a
person with the requisite interest to have standing.10
As I see it, then, whatever the Constitution may give by
way of formal authority over monetary matters to Congress,
8. Paraphrased from DAVIS, supra note 7, at 82.
9. 12 U.S.C. § 263.
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the effective control of such matters is a matter of admin-
istrative discretion. There are no checks in a legal sense
on this power; such checks as do operate would seem to
be political in nature.
When I use the word "political," I don't mean this in
any invidious sense. I mean it to describe the operation of
the American political system. Congress, in short, has ab-
dicated-in this, as well as many other matters of great
public importance. Furthermore, delegation to the Open
Market Committee, which is partially a "private" organiza-
tion, in that its membership is partly made up of bankers
who are not government employees, is not out of the main-
stream of modern constitutional law The agriculture pro-
gram may be cited, as well as certain "delegations" under
military contracts, for support of such a statement." The
flow of power toward the Executive, which is considered to
be a fact of modern American government, has found a
willing ally in Congress. It is not extravagant to say that
Congress is slowly bleeding to death-largely from self-
inflicted wounds.
3. In order for the objectives of the Employment Act
of 1946 to be carried out, it is desirable and necessary that
economic policies be unified.
Under the Employment Act,'12 it became a continuing
policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to
coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources
for the purpose of creating and maintaining conditions un-
der which there will be afforded useful employment oppor-
tunities and to promote maximum employment, produc-
tion, and purchasing power
10. DAVIS, supra note 7, collects the cases on standing to challenge adminis-
trative action.
11. See e.g., Miller, Administration by Contract* A New Concern for the Ad-
,nintstrative Lawyer 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 957 (1961), and Lowi, How the Farmers
Get What They Want, The Reporter, May 21, 1961, p. 34.
12. 60 Stat. 23 (1946). See RoSTOW, PLANNING FOR FREEDOM THE PUBLIC
LAW OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1959) for a discussion of the operative impact
of this statute.
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This Act, which is of such basic importance that it
takes on the character of a constitutional amendment, is the
basic charter under which government affirmatively seeks
to improve the American economy, and also the economic
well-being of the American people.
I should think that if the objectives of the Employment
Act are to be attained, as I believe they should, it is of
the highest importance that the policies of all organs of
government be consistent with each other; that, in other
words, there be a high degree of congruity in economic
policy It is my understanding that at present such con-
gruity, if it is reached, is attained through a policy of
consultation and coordination; but that, however, there is
no legal requirement for the Federal Reserve Board to coor-
dinate its policies with the Treasury Department, or with
anyone else.
This violates at least two principles:
(a) In the first place, it makes congruity of policy a
matter of accident of personality and of whether or not
given governmental officials get along well enough together
to cooperate rather than fight. I believe it to be a principle
of good government that policy-makers dealing with the
same matters be required to mesh their policies. Put another
way, there may be validity in the constitutional separation
of powers, and checks and balances, as between branches
of government-but no merit whatever in a similar separa-
tion within a functional area of governmental concern and
within a given branch of government.
(b) In the second place, the Federal Reserve Board,
in all of its operations, seems to be an independent organiza-
tion, not responsible or accountable to any official, including
the President, within the Executive branch, and the oversight
of which by the Congress may be more apparent than real.
To the extent that the Board operates autonomously, it would
seem to run contrary to another principle in our constitutional
order-that of the accountability of power
236 [Vol. 40
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In brief, then, once the Federal Government undertook
the affirmative responsibility of maintenance of minimal
conditions of economic prosperity within the country, the
question of fragmentation of power became acute. In my
judgment, it is no longer desirable, if indeed it ever was,
for there to be several agencies working at cross purposes
within any area of concern. Other techniques must be de-
vised to insure against despotism, or the improper use of
power Government must be accountable, in other words,
but officials must be enabled to do necessary tasks.
I might add that of course this is not the only area in
which a proliferating governmental structure finds agencies
and policies working toward inconsistent goals. To mention
but one example, even a cursory examination of the con-
tracting policies of the Government will quickly indicate a
number of inconsistencies and incongruities in policies and
programs.1 3
Furthermore, it must be noted that even if the Federal
Reserve Board is put by law within the Executive Branch,
that does not mean that the President can or would exercise
complete control. Modern studies of decision-making in that
branch, such as Neustadt's Presidential Power, clearly in-
dicate that the executive departments and agencies have
power of great importance, and that the President, contrary
to popular opinion, ordinarily cannot flatly order many ac-
tions he personally might deem desirable. He still, as Neu-
stadt points out, must negotiate with the leaders of the
"feudalities" within the Executive branch. Former President
Truman put this in words recently in a quotation which
Neustadt has in his book.14 He says, "I sit here all day
trying to persuade people to do the things they ought to
have sense enough to do without my persuading them." And
that is about all the presidential power amounts to, accord-
ing to the former President.
4. The Federal Reserve Board, under present constitu-
13. Discussed in Miller & Pierson, Observations on the Consistency of Federal
Procurement Policies with Other Governmental Policies, 29 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 277 (1964).
14. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 9-10 (1960).
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tional law, is not a part of the Executive branch of govern-
ment.
The Board was described by the Attorney General shortly
after its creation as "an independent board or Government
establishment."15 There is no authoritative court decision
indicating the constitutional nature of the Board or of the
Open Market Committee. What decisions as there are
relate to the power of the President to remove a postmaster,
an officer of the Federal Trade Commission, an official of
the Tennessee Valley Authority, and of the War Claims Com-
mission. We have four recent Supreme Court decisions deal-
ing with the power of the President to remove officials within
the Executive branch of government. These are decisions
which are of relevance here. 1G
An attempt by the President to remove an appointed
member of the Board of Governors prior to the end of the
term for which he has been appointed would probably be in-
validated by the Supreme Court, unless the Court was willing
to overrule, or to distinguish, the Humphrey and Wiener
decisions. Whether it would so rule is a matter of conjecture.
Under the terms of section 10 of the Federal Reserve Act of
1913,17 the President may remove Board members "for
cause." The statutory command, however, is unclear
as to what "cause" may mean. If the Court follows the
Humphrey case then it would likely be that the Board mem-
bers would not be called purely executive officers but rather
would be considered to exercise executive power not vested
by the Constitution in the President. If that be valid, then
it may be appropriate to recall the words of the late Justice
Jackson about administrative agencies:"'
They have become a veritable fourth branch of Gov-
ernment, which has deranged our three-branch legal
15. 30 Ops. ATT'y GEN. 308 (1914).
16. The leading cases are Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). up-
holding removal of a postmaster* Humphrey's Executor v. United States. 295
U.S. 602 (1935). awarding back pay to estate of invalidly removed Federal Trade
Commissioner- Morgan v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1941) upholding removal of a director of
TVA, Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), invalidating attempted re-
moval of War Claims Commissioner.
17. 12 U.S.C. § 242.
18. F.T.C. v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-488 (1952).
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theories much as the concept of a fourth dimension
unsettles our three dimensional thinking. Courts have
differed in assigning a place to these seemingly neces-
sary bodies in our constitutional system. Administra-
tive agencies have been called quasi-legislative, quasi-
executive or quasi-judicial, as the occasion required,
in order to validate their functions within the separa-
tion-of-powers scheme of the Constitution. The mere
retreat to the qualifying "quasi" is implicit with
confession that all recognized classifications have
broken down, and "quasi" is a smooth cover which
we draw over our confusion as we might use a
counterpane to conceal a disordered bed.
In my judgment, however, it may well be, or certainly
could be argued, that the President could constitutionally
remove a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, provided he avoided the bald statements
which the President used in the Humphrey and Wiener
cases. In the Wiener case President Eisenhower said that
he regarded it in the national interest "to complete the
administration of the War Claims Act of 1948 with personnel
of my own selection." 19
An arguable constitutional case could possibly be made,
so far as the law is concerned, for the President to remove
a member of the Board of Governors. I do not make any
statement about whether this is wise or politically feasible.
That is quite another question. I do not think that we have
any solid precedent, on the other hand, which necessarily
rules out the power of the President in this area.
In sum, then, the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System reflects what the President's Committee on
Administrative Management said in 1937 . 20
[The independent agencies] are in reality miniature
independent governments set up to deal with the
railroad problem, the banking problem, or the radio
problem. They constitute a "headless" fourth branch
of Government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible
agencies and uncoordinated powers. They do violence
to the basic theory of the American Constitution that
19. 357 U.S. at 351 (1958).
20. Quoted in JAFFE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND COMMENTS 96 (1954).
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there should be three major branches of government
and only three. The Congress has found no effective
way to deal with them, they cannot be controlled by
the President, and they are answerable to the courts
only in respect to the legality of their actions.
We have come a long way since 1937, when that state-
ment was made, far enough to realize that a rigid tripartite
division of governmental power is not necessarily sacred.
The doctrine of the separation of powers does not so severely
compartmentalize governmental powers as some students
of the Constitution have thought. But that statement does,
nonetheless, seem to characterize the situation.
5. The crisis in American institutions.
In conclusion, in my judgment the United States is un-
dergoing a crisis in the sense that its institutions are being
tested, as never before in our history, to determine their
adequacy in meeting the pressing needs of the day The
challenges to the American system are many and obvious.
Pre-eminent is that of the Soviet Union, as a center of power
and as a contestant for the loyalties of hundreds of millions
of the peoples of the world.
Equally challenging-but in a different way-is the "rev-
olution of rising expectations" of the underprivileged nations
of the world. Within the United States itself there are a
number of problems which are not being met in any ade-
quate manner Thus, to take only one example, our edu-
cational system seems unable to produce enough high quality
people for all the professions. The point I want to emphasize
is that just because something has existed for some time
does not mean that it retains whatever validity it may once
have had. Justice Holmes once said that it is odious to
have no other reason than history to support a given idea.
There is a need for a re-examination of all government
policies, including monetary policies, in the light of the re-
sponsibilities undertaken by the Federal Government in the
last thirty years. If the economists can show, as I take it
they can, that the activities of the Federal Reserve Board
and the Open Market Committee have substantial importance
[Vol. 40
THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD
for the American economy, 21 then in my judgment these
activities should be brought within the Executive branch
proper Without reflecting in the slightest degree. on the in-
tegrity of Board officials, I do not believe that they should
operate independently of the Chief Executive.
It is, of course, true that other segments of the economy
are left to similar devices, all at the instance of Congress.
I refer here to the several so-called independent regulatory
commissions. The same case that can be made for bringing
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and the Open Mar-
ket Committee within the framework of the Executive branch
can also be made for other independent agencies. Power
under a constitutional order means accountable, that is,
responsible, power
Furthermore, the factual situation in 1964 is markedly
different from that existing in 1913 when the Federal Reserve
System was established. Fundamentally, this can be reduced
to the concept that governmental responsibility has been
assumed for the well-being of the economy, a goal for which
all organs of government are concerned and which calls
for the close meshing of public policies. The "headless
fourth branch of government" should be brought within
the Executive branch; it should be made responsive to the
public interest, broadly conceived; it should, in other words,
be given a "head."
I realize that there is a considerable amount of discus-
sion going on about the concept of the public interest, who
determines it, how it is determined, and how it is furthered
by officials of government, including Congressional officials.
The concept of the public interest is, as Justice Frankfurter
once said, a tapestry of many threads. As the legislation
delegating power to the administrative agencies has devel-
oped it, it is really an empty vessel into which the agencies
can pour anything they wish. A devotion to the "public
interest," which I take it all of us have, in government and
out, and including members of the Open Market Committee
21. See Heartngs Before the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the House
Banking and Currency Committee ("The Federal Reserve System After Fifty
Years"), vol. 1, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
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as well as any other members of the banking community,
does not answer any questions in and of itself. It seems
to me we have to go much further in asking difficult ques-
tions of what is the content to be given the public interest
in a given factual situation, such as the monetary system
of this country 22
It may be said in conclusion that the question of mone-
tary and fiscal policy, as an intergral part of the over-all
economic policy of the American government, will be in the
forefront of attention for many years. In this process, the
decision made in 1913 to establish the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem in its present form will be thoroughly re-examined.
Changes may well be in the offing, perhaps not in the next
year or two, but possibly within the next decade. What those
changes might be cannot be forecast at the present time.
It is likely, however, that if changes do occur, they will be
in the direction of greater control by the President over
the operations of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System.
22. See Miller, supra note 7, for a discussion of "the public interest."
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